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STATUTES 
7QA-3-408, U.C.A. 1953, as amended: 
Consideration. Want or failure of consideration is a 
defense as against any person not having the rights of 
a holder in due course (Section 70A-3-305), except that 
no consideration is necessary for an instrument or 
obligation thereon given in payment of or as security 
for an antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing in 
this section shall be taken to displace any statute 
outside this act under which a promise is enforceable 
notwithstanding lack or failure of consideration. 
Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto 
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or 
liquidated amount. 
78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953, as amended: 
Parol evidence of contents of writing—When admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, 
other than the writing itself, except in the following 
cases: 
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in 
which case proof of the loss or destruction must 
first be made. 
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to 
produce it after reasonable notice. 
(3) When the original is a record or other document in 
the custody of a public officer. 
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(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record 
or a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this 
code or other statute. 
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts 
or other documents which cannot be examined in 
court without great loss of time, and the evidence 
sought from them is only the general result of the 
whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, 
institution, member of a profession 
or calling, or any department or 
agency of a government, in the 
regular course of business or activity 
has kept or recorded any memorandum, 
writing, entry, print, representation 
or combination thereof, of any act, 
transaction, occurrence or event, and 
in the regular course of business has 
caused any or all of the same to be 
recorded, copied or reproduced by any 
photographic, photostatic, microfilm, 
microcard, miniature photographic, or 
other process which accurately reproduces 
or forms a durable medium for so re-
producing the original, and the original 
may be destroyed in the regular course 
of business unless held in a custodial 
or fiduciary capacity or unless its 
preservation is required by law; and 
such reproduction, when satisfactorily 
identified, is as admissible in evidence 
as the original itself in any judicial 
or administrative proceeding whether 
the original is in existence or not, and 
an enlargement or facsimile of such re-
production is likewise admissible in 
evidence if the original reproduction is 
in existence and available for inspection 
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under direction of court. The 
introduction of a reproduced 
record, enlargement or facsimile, 
does not preclude admission of the 
original. 
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions 
(3) and (4), a copy of the original, or 
of the record, must be produced; in those 
mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2), 
either a copy or oral evidence of the 
contents. 
J70A-3-104, U.C.A. 1953, as amended: 
Form of negotiable instruments--"praft", "Check" "Certificate 
of Deposit , "Note", CD Any writing to be a negotiable 
instrument within this chaper must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a 
sum certain in money and no other promise, order, 
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer 
except as authorized by this chapter; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A Complaint was filed in the instant case on March 23, 1983, 
in the Third Dictrict Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
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A trial was held before Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
District Judge, Third District Court, on September 27, 1984. 
He issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
December 21, 1984, where he ordered the Complaint to be 
dismissed on the merits as no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Harold Okubo, a West Jordan produce farmer, was contacted 
by his nephew Byron and informed of the business investments 
of Byron's employer, Dr. George R. Parker. Mr. Okubo eventually 
spoke directly with Dr. Parker, who invited him to his office 
for further discussion regarding investing (R. 7-9; 89-90). Dr. 
Parker, a dentist, had invested approximately $200,000 in the 
Martell Corporation, a company engaged in the diamond import-
export business and a dehydrated food processing and sales operation. 
Dr. Parker indicated that he had been receiving favorable returns 
on his investment (R. 47). 
Mr. Okubo was interested in investing himself in the Martell 
Corporation, but was uncomfortable doing so with people and a 
company with which he was unfamiliar (R. 90, 104). Dr. Parker 
offered his personal promissory note as backup for any money 
Mr. Okubo should invest (R. 9,33). On the basis of Dr. Parker's 
guarantee, on January 14, 1980, Mr. Okubo gave Dr. Parker his 
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check for $40,000 made out to Sterling Martell of the Martell 
Corporation. At the same time, Dr. Parker executed a promissory 
note for $40,000 in favor of Mr. Okubo "as an accommodation to 
both Mr. Okubo and Mr. Martell" (R. 69; 76-77). The note was 
dated January 14, 1980, and due January 14, 1981. 
During 1980 the Martell Corporation repaid $10,000 to Mr. 
Okubo, but by January 14, 1981, he had failed to receive any 
additional amounts (R. 10). On March 23, 1983, having received 
no payment after demand for such on the promissory note, Mr. 
Okubo filed a complaint against Dr. Parker on the note. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The subject promissory note is supported by 
consideration and as such is a valid intrument which is 
entitled to enforcement according to its terms. 
II. The court below erred in allowing parol evidence to 
vary the terms of the promissory note. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONSIDERATION EXISTED FOR THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
THEREBY MAKING IT" VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST 
DEFENDANT 
A
* Consideration: Benefit to the Promisor 
In accordance with the rules relating to other contracts, 
it is well settled that as between the immediate parties to a 
note, a sufficient consideration is essential to the existence 
of a valid and binding undertaking. 10 C.J.S. 5143 p. 599. 
The rules relating to the consideration for contracts 
generally determine what constitutes sufficient consideration 
for the undertaking of a party to a note. Value is any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract. There is sufficient 
consideration if there is any benefit, profit, or advantage to 
the promisor or any loss, detriment, or inconvenience to the 
promisee. 10 C.J.S. 5148(a) p. 601; Uniform Commercial Code, 
§70A-3-408, U.C.A. 1953, as amended (Official Comment 3); 
Hallowell v. Turner, 94 Ida 718, 496 P.2d 955 (1972). 
By the time Mr. Okubo invested his $40,000 on January 14, 
1980, Dr. Parker had already invested the following in the 
Martell Corporation: (See Supplemental Interrogatory #11 and 
R. 80-82) 
DATE AMOUNT ITEM 
9/15/78 $59,799.85 Diamonds 
10/3/78 15,385.22 Rubies or Diamonds 
(See R. 81, 84) 
10/4/78 52,898.78 Diamonds 
4/27/79 65,000.00 Cash 
TOTAL: $193,083.85 
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The infusing of an additional $40,000 into a company 
where Dr. Parker already had a substantial investment was a 
definite benefit to Dr. Parker* His interest in the stability 
and ongoing performance of the Martell Corporation was extremely 
high* The viability of the company was more likely to continue 
and improve with the addition of each capital contribution, and 
a strong Martell Corporation made it more likely that Dr. Parker 
would preserve and realize returns on his own investment* 
There was a benefit to the promisor, Dr. Parker, through 
a strengthened Martell Corporation and the increased likelihood 
that he would recoup his own substantial investment. Thus, 
consideration did exist to support the $40,000 promissory note. 
B. Consideration: Loss or Detriment to the Promisee 
Consideration also exists if there is any loss, detriment 
or inconvenience to the promisee. It is not necessary that 
any benefit should accrue to the promisor if something of 
value flows from the promisee or he suffers some prejudice 
or inconvenience and the promise is the inducement of the 
transaction. 10 C.J.S. §148(a) p. 601. 
Harold Okubo, the promisee, experienced a loss. Something 
of value, namely $40,000, flowed from him. Thus, under this 
aspect of consideration, consideration did exist to support 
the promissory note and render it viable and enforceable 
against the defendant. 
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C. Consideration: Benefit to a Third Person 
The consideration or benefit need not necessarily pass 
or flow to the promisor* If given at the instance or request 
of the promisor, there may be a sufficient consideration in 
the form of a benefit given to a third person. 10 G.J.S* §148(b) 
p. 602. 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 75(2) provides: 
Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some 
other person. Illustration 6 of this subsection coincides with 
the instant fact situation: 
6. A makes a promissory note payable to B in 
return for a payment by B to C. The 
payment is consideration for the note. 
A bargained-for consideration may be given to the promisor 
or to some other person. Investment Properties of Ashville, 
Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E. 2d 342, 343-344 (1972); 
Alexander v. DeLaCruz> 545 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976); Unruh 
v. Nevada National Bank, 88 Nev 427, 498 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1972); 
T & S Assn. v. Superior Court. 4 Cal.App.3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
421, 423 (1970). 
Dr. Parker signed a note promising to pay Harold Okubo 
$40,000 on January 14, 1981. Mr. Okubo endorsed a check 
payable to Sterling Martell of the Martell Corporation in the 
amount of $40,000. The benefit of the $40,000 flowed immediately 
to Mr. Martell, a third party, and not to the promisor, Dr. 
Parker. Under the foregoing definition for consideration, 
the note is supported by consideration to a third party. 
8 
D#
 Consideration: Some Valid Consideration is Adequate 
Some valid or valuable consideration is all that the 
law requires to support the undertaking of a party to a bill 
or note. If such a consideration exists, its adequacy or 
sufficiency as compared to the value of the thing promised 
is ordinarily immaterial in the absence of fraud, mistake, 
or undue influence. The undertaking may be supported by a 
consideration of a most trifling nature or a consideration 
having no value in the monetary sense and it is in no way 
requisite that the consideration for a bill or note be 
adequate in value to the face amount of the instrument. 
10 C.J.S. §H8(c) p. 603. 
The increased likelihood that Dr. Parker would 
recoup his own investment because of the additional $40,000 
capital contribution of Mr. Okubo to the Martell Corporation 
meets the test for the foregoing aspect of consideration. 
There is a benefit to the promisor, Dr. Parker, but no 
specific monetary valuation can be attributed to the advantage. 
The benefit is more than merely trifling; it has some valid 
value. Thus, again, one must conclude that consideration 
exists for Dr. Parkerfs promissory note. 
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II. THE PROMISSORY NOTE IS COMPLETE AND SUFFICIENT 
IN ITS TERMS SO AS TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE VARYING 
THE TERMS THEREOF. 
The promissory note of Dr. Parker is a valid, enforceable 
promissory note sufficient in its terms. It meets the require-
ments for a negotiable note under §70A-3-104, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended; 
To be negotiable, a note must: 
(1) Be signed by the maker. 
(2) Contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum 
certain. 
(3) Be payable on demand or at a definite time. 
(4) Be payable to order or bearer. 
The subject promissory note was signed by Dr. George Parker, 
the wording promises payment without condition, it is payable 
for the certain sum of $40,000, is payable on January 14, 1981, 
and is payable to the order of "Hutch" (Harold) Okubo. 
Consequently, the note is a valid instrument, sufficient in 
its terms, which should be enforced according to the explicit 
wording on its face. 
As a valid written agreement, in the absence of fraud or 
mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, 
add to, or subtract from the terms of the agreement. Fox Film 
Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co.. 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294; Last Chance 
v. Erickson, 25 P.2d 952 (Utah 1933). 
Although Mr. Okubo (R. 35), Dr. Parker (R. 71), and Mr. 
Martell (R. 122) all testified that the promissory note 
constituted the only written agreement between the parties and 
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that there were no additional contracts between them, the 
Defendant was allowed to introduce testimony to vary the terms 
of the note* The testimony consisted of oral representations 
intended to limit the effectiveness and duration of the note. 
The oral explanations were in conflict with the written terms 
of the agreement. 
In McCornick v. Levy, 37 U. 134, 106 P. 660 (1910), a suit 
to foreclose a mortgage, contemporaneous and collateral oral 
agreements were not admissible to show that the note and 
mortgage were to be payable in merchandise. The court said 
that where parties have deliberately put their contract in 
writing the agreement cannot be overturned nor varied by 
showing a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement which is in 
conflict with the written agreement. In Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden 
Theatre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294, an action for money due 
under a written contract for leasing news reel films, evidence 
of oral representations of plaintifffs salesman as to when and 
how films were to be delivered and that they would be the 
latest issues was inadmissible. 
Under §78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, there can be no 
evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing 
itself, except: 
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed. 
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom it is offered. 
(3) When the original is in the custody of a public officer. 
(4) When the original has been recorded and the record or 
a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code 
or other statute. 
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(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts. 
The instant promissory note does not fall within any of 
the exceptions to the foregoing statute. Therefore, there 
can be no evidence of the contents of the note presented other 
than the note itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The $40,000 promissory note of Defendant George Parker in 
favor of Plaintiff Harold Okubo is a valid written agreement, 
supported by consideration, which should be enforced according 
to its terms without allowance for oral explanation to vary 
its content. 
The Order of the lower court should be reversed with judgment 
given in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum of $76,695.00 as of 
September 27, 1984, attorneyfs fees of $4,042.00, together with 
costs incurred herein. Further, the court should award an 
additional $1,500.00 for attorney's fees incurred on the Appeal. 
As an alternative, the case should be remanded to the lower court 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 6 day of May, 1985, 
iff-Appellant 
12 
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PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest) 
JIM .1.4 „&). 
• undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order 
Fxt sJ. K.£<5 , S'A./x.x...a.i.c.e 
- t4ui<:.M QLCuJSc Q. 
., Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof snoy designate 
-/ / M6' 
ng. Ih. .um *.. .J^\E:Xl.. lh«Q..kAJ^JfciU^..j4&- / V'r^Dollor. ($ ifOOUCu.). poyobl tie os follows* 
»r both before and offer Judgment, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from dote until paid at the rote of TJBxLtft^ p%t cent ( . io^J ' % ) 
num, interest payable as followsi 
Jf^y/ Itf . 1<£?l 
repoyme.it of this note with interest to date of payment may be made of any time without penalty. 
f the holder deems itself insecure or if default be mode )n payment of the whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the pine© 
the tome becomes dv and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall, ot the election of the holder 
nnd w thout notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and 
My agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs ie oddition to all other sun.t dum 
^der 
'resentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice ard hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the 
e of any i«curiry, or any port thereof, with or without substity 
/ 
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RAIPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
800 Mclntyre liuilding 
G8 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8-1101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN TIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JIJDK LAI DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
IIAHOID K. OKUIJT), 
I'lamt iff, 
vs. 
GEORGE R. PARKER, 
lJef endant . 
* » * • • * » • • • 
THE AH0\T: MATTER having cane on lor t n . i l t.< lo re The Honorable 
Kenneth Rigt rup on t h e 27th day of Septemlx>r, H»H l, at 10:00 A.M., the p la in 1 ' 
appear ing and Ix-mg r ep re sen t ed by I n s a t t o r n e y , Mall Hi l . j an i r , and the 
defendant appear ing and be ing rt p resen ted by hi- a i t t . r nev , Ralph J . Marsh, anu 
the p a r t i e s having p resen ted t h e i r evidence and arguments to the . ourt and 
the cour t having cons idered the m a t t e r , now makes 11-. f ind ings and . one lusi . . tc 
as t o l l ows : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. P la in t i l l was con tac ted b\ h i s n< ph< w, Hvi<>n okubo, alxnit .in 
investment with S t e r l i n g M a r t e l l . 
2 . P l a i n t i f f was t o l d that he would n . i \\< a r e tu rn on h i s invest"* 
el two and one-ha l f ( 2 . 5 " ) percent per month, ur J h; rt \ (30.OX) j y r e e n t per y 
3 . Defendant had p rev ious ly advanced/IIDIK \ . a •> an invesfyni nt in 
Sii-r l inR Mart e l l ' s co rp» ra t ion and a l s o achanced l in t her money to the corpora ' 
t h e r e a f t e r . 
- 2 -
(I 
' 9.1 1984 
/ 
FINDINGS (Jl FA(T AND 
" O0NC1J iSK)Ns"by I .AW 
( i v i 1 N.i. (83-2225 
-2-
4. Defendant told plaintiff that he thought it was a good investment. 
5. Plaintiff, defendant and Byron Okubo had some discussions about 
diamonds or dried chicken chunks as collateral for the money advanced by plaintltr. 
6. On January 14, 1980, plaintiff wrote out a check to Sterling 
Martell in the amount of $40,000.00. 
7. At the request of plaintiff, defendant .signed the document identified 
as Exhibit "P-l" to be held by plaintiff until the delivery to plaintiff of 
security for his investment. 
8. The check was delivered to Byron Okubo, in the presence of defendar.t , 
and Byron Okubo delivered the check to Sterling Martell. 
9. The check was endorsed and cashed by Stirling Martell in San Franci -
California. 
10. Plaintiff thought he was investing in Martell Corporation and not 
in the defendant. 
11. No payment or consideration of any kind was paid to defendant and 
none of the money advanced by plaintiff went to the defendant. 
12. Two to three months after the check was written by plaintiff, 
plaintiff received from Martell Corporation some documents describing several 
cases of dried chicken chunks to be held by plaint if i as s<*curity for plaintiff*^ 
inve>tment. One ol the documcmts was to be returned to Mai tell Corporation in 
orVr for plaintiff to take delivery of the security. Another of the documents 
A i > a receipt for the security. 
13. Plaintiff did not return the document or resixjnd in any way or take 
inj action to take possession of the security. 
14. Plaintiff was told by Sterling Martell thai the security was being 
stored for him. 
15. Except lor one meeting with the defendant, a telephone call from 
Merling Martell and the documents received by plaintift trom Martell Corporation, 
all containications by or to plaintiff regarding this in\.^ uiient were handled 
through Byron Okubo, plaintiff's nephew. 
16. On September 12, 1980, plaintiff received a $10,000.00 payment from 
Martell Corporation. 
17. No other payments were received by plaint itf with regard to the 
investment. 
-3-
-3-
OQNCLUSIQNS OF LAW 
it of iD l^i• IX, '/«fe 
Prom the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Byron Okubo was not the agen
2. Plaintiff did not lend any money to defendant or to Martell or 
Martell Corporation. No loan transaction was involved. 
3. Plaintiff made an investment of $40,000.00 in Martell Corporation 
with some assurance of security therefor to be delivered in the future. 
4. The transaction was not a consumer sale or loan under the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 
5. The document signed by defendant, Exhibit nP-ln,was not clear on 
its face that it was a promise to answer for the debt of another and was not 
specific as to what collateral would be delivered or as to the time of deliven 
of such collateral. 
6. Exhibit "P-l" is not legally sufficient as a note or agreement to 
answer for the debt of another. 
7. Exhibit "P-l" was delivered by defendant to plaintiff as a 
ttjnporary surety until the delivery of security. 
8. No consideration was given or passed to defendant for the signing 
of Flxhibit nP-l,f or for the investment by plaintiff m Martell Corporation. 
9. The defendant has no liability to th< plaintiff and plaintiffs 
complaint should lx> dismissed on the merits as no cause of action. 
10. No attorney's fees should be awarded to either party. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE liKRFWim 
DATED this %/ ^day of December, 
(( 
_4-
Q. And Mr. Okubo, have you calculated the 
principal and interest that would be owing to you through 
October 1, 1980 on this note? 
A. Yes. 
0- Do you have that figure available? 
A. I have it right here. It's $76,695. 
Q. And it's your testimony under oath that 
that amount is due and owing to you; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Dr. Parker is seated in the courtroom, is 
he not, next to Mr, Marsh? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He's the one that executed the promissory 
note? 
A. Yes, he did. 
0. Did you at any time prior to the execution 
of this note, or afterwards, have any dealings with 
Mr. Sterling Martel? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Have you ever had any conversations with 
him? 
A. I never met the man until he came here 
today. 
Q. And has that man ever handed you any cash 
or paid you anything in the way of diamonds or anything? 
II 
the court indicating the time that's been spent, the work 
that's been spent based on a billing charge of $125 per 
hour, and the affidavit contains alJ the dates that I 
prepared documents, including preparation of the initial 
documents after a meeting with my client, and the first 
meeting, of course, was March 11, 198 3. 
I had a one-hour conference with my client 
at that time. On the 14th I had a two-hour conference 
regarding this matter, and then a demand letter was sent 
to Dr. Parker on March 16. On March 22, I researched the 
issue of parole evidence, spent two and a half hours. 
On March 22 I prepared the complaint, which took half an 
hour. On March 25, the complaint was filed, and the filing 
fee of $25 is included in this as part of that fee, but 
it should be reflected as a cost. The total is $4,109.4J.1 
There are also included the service of a summons and 
complaint for $9, so that total amount should be reduced 
from this total to effectively arrive at the attorneys' 
fee . 
The review of Mr. Marsh's pleading on 
4-17, which was one and a half hours. There was 
preparation of interrogatories, two hours on 4-18. On 
May 22, telephone to my client concerning a reply. On 
May 22, telephone call to Mr. Marsh concerning his answer. 
The time spent on that, I think I billed out at $22.50. 
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